Extensive study on the complexity of computing Nash Equilibrium has resulted in the definition of the complexity class PPAD by Papadimitriou [15] . Subsequently, it was shown that Nash Equilibrium computation is PPAD-complete, first by Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [6] for 4 or more players, then by the same authors [6] for 3 players, and even for the bimatrix case by Chen and Deng [2] . On the other hand, it is well known that Nash equilibria of games with smooth payoff functions are generally Pareto-inefficient [5] . In particular, it means that it is possible that a strategy, possibly mixed, that is not a Nash equilibrium will admit a higher payoff for both players than a Nash equilibrium. In the spirit of Von Neumann's Minimax Theorem and its polynomial-time solvability via Linear Programming, Kalantari [10] has described a multilinear minimax relaxation (MMR) that provides an approximation to a convex combination of expected payoffs in any Nash Equilibrium via linear programming. In this paper, we study this relaxation for the bimatrix game, with payoff matrices normalized to values between 0 and 1, solving its corresponding LP formulation and comparing its solution to the solution computed by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. We also give a game theoretic interpretation of MMR formulation for the bimatrix game which involves a meta-player. Our relaxation has the following theoretical advantages:
Introduction
One of the first significant results in Game Theory was established by von Neumann [14] that any bimatrix zero-sum game has an equilibrium, known as the Minimax Theorem. Formally, the result is a statement on matrices: given an n × m real matrix A, there exists vectors x * ∈ R n , y * ∈ R m such that 
where, S k = {u ∈ R k : k i=1 u i = 1, u i ≥ 0}, the unit simplex in dimension k. The game theoretic interpretation of this formulation is as follows: Simultaneously, the Row player selects an index i ∈ [1, n] and the Column player selects an index j ∈ [1, m] . Then Row wins A ij dollars and Column loses A ij dollars. According to von Neumann's Minimax Theorem, there exist mixed strategy probability vector x * for Row and probability vector y * for Column so that the minimum expected win for Row is equal to the maximum expected loss for Column. The dimensions of the payoff matrices correspond to the number of actions for both players.
Nash [13] considered a more general game, where Row and Column each have their own n × m real matrices R = (R ij ) and C = (C ij ), called payoff matrices. Once Row selects a mixed strategy, i.e. a probability vector x ∈ S n and Column selects a probability vector y ∈ S m , with the composite vector p = (x, y), the payoffs for Row and Column are the quantities R[p] = x T Ry and C[p] = x T Cy, respectively. Nash's brilliant insight, as well as its proof, was the existence of a composite vector p * = (x * , y * ) such that max{R[p] : p = (x, y) ∈ S n × S m , y = y * } = R[p * ]
and
Thus neither Row nor Column can improve their payoffs when the other player's probability vector is fixed. In this sense there is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. p * . Nash equilibrium is not necessarily unique. We can also define the composite vector p * = (x * , y * ) to be the ε-Nash equilibrium if max{R[p] : p = (x, y) ∈ S n × S m , y = y * } ≤ R[p * ] + ε (4) and max{C[p] : p = (x, y) ∈ S n × S m , x = x * } ≤ C[p * ] + ε.
When the payoff matrices sum to zero, i.e. R = −C, von Neumann minimax is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, von Neumann's Minimax Theorem was shown to be equivalent to linear programming, hence solvable in polynomial time due to Khachiyan's work [11] . On the other hand computing the Nash equilibrium remains to be a challenging problem after decades of research.
Nash equilibrium can be generalized to more than two players. Denoting R and C by A 1 and A 2 , n, m as n 1 , n 2 and x, y as p 1 , p 2 , we can describe the problem in more generality where there are any number n ≥ 2 players and each player i is endowed with his/her own multidimensional payoff matrix A i , having a dimension n i for each player. Each player is allowed to select a probability vector p i ∈ S ni and the collection of these vectors defines a composite vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) that gives the payoff value for the player as the evaluation of the multidimensional matrix at p, denoted by A i [p]. The more general version of Nash equilibrium assures the existence of p * = (p 1 * , . . . , p n * ) so that there is equilibrium for each player, i.e. the maximum value of A i [p] when p i is allowed to range in its respective probability domain while for any other player j = i, p j = p j * , coincides with A i [p * ]. In a previous work Kalantari [10] has described a multilinear minimax relaxation, which we abbreviate as MMR, for Nash equilibrium with two or more players that provides an approximation to a convex combination of expected payoffs of a Nash Equilibrium. This relaxation has two advantages: (1) it is computable in polynomial time as it also formulated as a linear programming; (2) it provides an upper bound to a weighted sum of optimal player payoffs; (3) it gives a strategy (or profile) where at least one player's payoff is as good as his respective payoff in any Nash equilibrium. We call such profile 1-player-optimal. This relaxation provides a link between Nash equilibrium and Minimax, going from Nash equilibrium to a minimax problem, albeit multilinear and a relaxation as opposed to exact computation.
In this paper, we study this multilinear relaxation for the bimatrix case, solving its corresponding LP formulation and comparing its solution to Nash equilibria generated by state-of-the-art algorithms for computing Nash equilibria, such as the Lemke-Howsen algorithm, which is known to have worst-case exponential complexity [16] . Our results are promising both in theoretical and computational sense. On the one hand, while Lemke-Howson algorithm does not seem to be able to provide answers even in the case of 200 actions, the multilinear minimax relaxation provides good solution even for bimatrix games with 1000 actions. Furthermore, in about 80% of the cases, where Lemke-Howson can compute the Nash equilibrium, the quality of the solution is better than any Nash equilibria for both players. In the remaining cases while one player's payoff is better than any Nash Equilibrium payoff, the other player's payoff is only within a relative error of 17%. We also show that there is a convex scaling of the payoff matrices R and C by positive scalars d 1 and d 2 summing to one such that in the MMR, d 1 R and d 2 C have equal payoffs while it is known that at least one of them does better than any Nash equilibria, albeit we don't know which player.
The logical validity of MMR is strengthened by the tremendous research on computational complexity and efficiency of Nash equilbrium reviewed next. A major concept related to the complexity of the computation of Nash equilibria was introduced by Papadimitriou [15] : a new complexity class for computation of Nash equilibria called PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument in Directed Graphs). As described in Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [6] , PPAD is the complexity class of all search problems that can be reduced to the END OF THE LINE problem. The END OF THE LINE problem is a search problem where the input is a directed graph of n vertices that is the union of cycles and paths with 2 n vertices. Each vertex is represented by an n-bit string of 0 and 1, and the edges of a vertex v are described by two boolean circuits of polynomial size in n, P and S, each with n input bits and n output bits, giving the predecessor and the successor vertices of v. An unbalanced vertex is a vertex with an incoming edge but no outgoing edges, or an outgoing edge but no incoming edges. Given an unbalanced vertex v, END OF THE LINE outputs the other end of the path. Thus, a problem is PPAD-complete if the END OF THE LINE problem is polynomially reducible to it. PPAD is a subset of NP. Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [6] showed that the computation of Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for games with 4 or more players. Later, they showed that the computation of Nash equilibria for 3-player games is PPAD-complete [6] . Lastly, Chen and Deng [2] showed that the computation of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games, i.e. 2-player games, is PPAD-complete. On the other hand, it is well known that Nash equilibria is Pareto-inefficient. Dubey [5] has shown that the Nash equilibria of games with smooth payoff functions are generally Pareto-inefficient. Pareto efficiency is the state of a system where it is impossible for any player to change their strategy to increase their payoffs without making another player worse off.
In addition to the computational complexity of Nash equilibria, algorithms for its computation for bimatrix case have also been studied, such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm [12] and subsequently by von Stengel [17] , who showed that the algorithm has a worst-case exponential time complexity. The pivotal assumption for Lemke-Howson is that the game must be non-degenerate, i.e. if the number of pure best responses to a mixed strategy does not exceed the number of pure strategies with a positive probability, see [17] . However, small perturbations can turn a game into non-degenerate. The Lemke-Howson algorithm uses the idea that a mixed strategy can be labelled by an index respective to the player's pure best strategy and subsequent best responses. The Tableau Method for the Lemke-Howson algorithm is a way to turn the geometric interpretation of the Nash equilibria as endpoints of a path into a solution of a linear program. In this case, the disjoint paths and cycles are interpreted as vertices and edges of a polyhedron. Then, traversing a polyhedron's vertices amounts to pivoting. Using Linear Complementarity, the solution of these Nash equilibria can be found, see [17] . The algorithm can find every Nash equilibria of the game. Lemke-Howson algorithm runs in worst-case exponential time in the number of pure strategies to find even one Nash equilibrium for both players because of pivoting and traversing the polyhedron's vertices, see [16] . Therefore, Lemke-Howson algorithm is not viable for games where each player might have a large number of actions.
In summary, the computation of Nash Equilibria, even in bimatrix games, is intractable. In addition, it is known that Nash equilibria is Pareto-inefficient. Therefore, it is good to find efficiently computable relaxations that are reasonably sound. There are polynomial-time approximation algorithms for computing Nash equilibria available in the literature, in particular by Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [7] which gives an approximation guarantee of 0.38197. The approximation algorithm of Bosse, Byrka, Markakis [1] achieves a slightly better approximation guarantee of 0.36392. However, while their algorithm relies on computing modified games that are zero-sum, MMR works with the original payoff matrices. While, in this article, we do not have such theoretical bounds for MMR, we give experimental results which are very promising, both in performance and complexity of computation.
The organization of the remaining sections of the article is as follows: In Section 2, we give the formulation of the multilinear minimax relaxation for Nash Equilibria and its game theoretic interpretation. In Section 3, we give an algorithm for computations of MMR, along with two examples: one illustrating the Nash equilibria computed by Lemke-Howson and MMR algorithm, and the other illustrating that by MMR algorithm, at least one player has a better payoff than any payoff given by the Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we provide experimental results comparing MMR to the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Lastly, in Section 5, we give a theorem stating that for any bimatrix game, there exists a convex scaling that gives balanced payoffs to both players Row and Column. We also provide figures that illustrate, for games with different number of actions, how MMR payoffs change for various scalings.
The Multilinear Minimax Relaxation of Nash Equilibria
The Multilinear Minimax Relaxation (MMR) for Nash equilibria was introduced in [10] , and a formulation of a multilinear minimax theorem was stated and proven (Theorem 2 in [10] ). Here we describe it for the bimatrix game.
Consider the n × m matrices R = (R ij ) and C = (C ij ). For a positive integer k let
Set ∆ = S n × S m . Given α = (α 1 , α 2 ) ∈ S 2 and p = (x, y) ∈ ∆, consider the trilinear form
where
We will refer to A 0 [α, p] as weighted-sum payoff or expected payoff.
Let α * and p * = (x * , y * ) be the solution computed for the minimax formulation. Then, for any (α, p) ∈ S 2 ×∆ we have
Furthermore, (α * , p * ) is computable via a primal-dual pair of linear programming with O(n×m) variables.
It is important to note that in zero-sum games, i.e. games where the sum of the profits of both players equal to 0, the strategy given by the minimax solution is the same as the Nash equilibrium. However, this property is not generally true for all games. Thus, the minimax formulation given above serves only as an approximation.
A Game Theoretic Interpretation of MMR
Here we give a game theoretic interpretation of the multilinear minimax. In order to describe the game and the minimax approximation it is more convenient to give a uniform notation. So we will explain the game theoretic interpretation using this more convenient notation. The game takes place between three players, P 1 = Row, P 2 = Column, as well as a meta-player M . Players P 1 and P 2 are given two n 1 × n 2 payoff matrices, written for notational convenience as
The game is played by the players simultaneously choosing an action: M chooses an action i ∈ N = {1, 2}. P 1 chooses an action i 1 ∈ N 1 . P 2 chooses an action i 2 ∈ N 2 . The actions are revealed simultaneously. Once i ∈ N and I = (i 1 , i 2 ) ∈ N = N 1 × N 2 are revealed, M loses a(i, I) dollars to player i. Thus player i wins a(i, I) dollars. The other player does not win or lose. The number a(i, I) can be assumed to be positive or negative. Thus winning could actually be losing.
Strategies Under Pure Actions
Strategy for M : For each player P i , i ∈ N that M selects, the worst amount M could lose is max{a(i, I) : I ∈ N }. Thus M choose a player that minimizes this loss, i.e. M computes i from the following optimization:
Strategy for players P 1 and P 2 : For each I = (i 1 , i 2 ) ∈ N formed by their individual selection of i 1 , i 2 , M will lose at least min{a(i, I) : i ∈ N } dollars. So the best actio pair I is the one that maximizes this loss, i.e. the players P 1 and P 2 compute their probability vector I by solving:
As in the case zero-sum game the two quantities may be different.
Strategies Under Randomized Actions
Suppose that M and the players P 1 , P 2 choose their actions randomly: M chooses a player with probability vector α ∈ S 2 . P 1 chooses an action with probability vector p 1 ∈ S n1 . P 2 chooses an action with probability vector p 2 ∈ S n2 . Set p = (p 1 , p 2 ). Let ∆ = S n1 × S n2 . For each I = (i 1 , i 2 ) ∈ N , let p(I) = p 1 i1 p 2 i2 . The expected payoff for each player P 2 , i = 1, 2 is:
Strategy for M : For each α ∈ S 2 he selects, the worst expected loss is the maximum of the weighted payoff
as p ranges in ∆. Thus he choose the players according to the probability vector α that minimizes this loss, i.e.
Strategy for P 1 and P 2 : For each p ∈ ∆ they select, the minimum expected loss for M is the minimum of α 1 A 1 [p] + α 2 A 2 [p] as x ranges in S 2 . Thus the best I ∈ N is the one that maximizes this. i.e. 
According to Theorem 1 the two quantities (13) and (14) are equal.
Applications to Approximation of Nash Equilibrium
Suppose p * = (p 1 * , p 2 * ) ∈ S n1 × S n2 is a Nash Equilibrium corresponding to payoff matrices A 1 and A 2 , i.e. max p 1 ∈Sn 1
By substituting p * for p in Theorem 1, we get:
Let p * be a Nash equilibrium and p * a solution to multilinear minimax relaxation. Then
In other words we can approximate a weighted average of A i [p * ] in Nash equilibrium via an optimal minimax value. As a corollary we get,
In particular, if both inequalities are satisfied, then p * gives a better payoff than p * for both players. Remark 1. According to Corollary 1, by solving the multilinear minimax relaxation we are guaranteed that at least one player has a payoff that is no worse than any Nash equilibrium payoff.
Remark 2. Theorem 1 is valid for any number of players and the corresponding p * can be computed in polynomial-time, in contrast to the computation for Nash equilibria, which even in the bimatrix games is PPAD-complete [2] . Thus, MMR may particularly work well in the bimatrix case because the computational complexity is O(n × m), where n and m are the number of actions for both players.
Algorithmic Computation of Multilinear Minimax Relaxation
A very important algorithmic aspect of the multilinear minimax relaxation is that it can be solved via linear programming. Following the general formulation in [10] of the LP and dual LP for MMR, it can be shown that for the bimatrix case these are defined as follows:
Let Q be the n × m matrix (q ij ). Given a positive integer k let e (k) = (1, . . . , 1) T ∈ R k . Then set
x * = Qe (m) , y * = Q T e (n) .
In other words x * is the vector of row sums of Q and y * is the vector of column sums. Then x * is the strategy for the Row player, and y * is the strategy for the Column player. From this, (3) and (4) follows.
Remark 3. In theory, x * and y * should be vectors that sum to 1. However, in practice, due to round-off errors, x * and y * may need to be normalized.
Example of Nash Equilibria and Solution of MMR
We now provide an example to illustrate how Lemke-Howson and MMR algorithm works Suppose the game has the following payoff matrices for Row player and Column player, This is the same pair of strategies as the one found using Lemke-Howson, so the MMR payoffs are the same as the Nash equilibrium payoffs.
Example Illustrating the Dominance of Solutions of MMR
We now illustrate Corollary 1, which guarantees at least one player has a payoff no worse than any Nash equilibrium. Suppose the following bimatrix game is played, where Row player and Column player have the following payoff matrices: On the other hand, by using multilinear minimax, one has the following dual linear program: max λ s.t. 0.388q 11 + 0.600q 12 + · · · + 0.031q 33 − λ ≥ 0 1.0q 11 + 0.132q 12 + · · · + 0.905q 33 − λ ≥ 0 q 11 + q 12 + · · · + q 33 = 1 q 11 , q 12 , · · · , q 33 ≥ 0 This gives an approximate Nash equilibrium p * = (x * , y * ), where
x * = (0, 0, 1), y * = (0, 1, 0) This relaxation gives a payoff of 0.850 for the Row player and 0.904 for the Column player. The payoffs of the three true Nash equilibria for Row player are 0.482, 0.716, and 0.806. thus Row player has a payoff found by MMR algorithm better than any payoffs from the three Nash equilibria,
Experimental Results
Here we describe our computational results, comparing MMR and the Lemke-Howson algorithms. For Lemke-Howson algorithm, we used the function lcp solve from Gambit 15.1.1 to compute the Nash equilibria. For MMR algorithm, we used the python library CVXOPT, which uses the glpx library to solve the corresponding LP-problems. Programs run for a maximum time of 30 minutes before they are terminated and returned an error. This choice is appropriate since MMR algorithm can run games with number of actions up to 2000 in 30 minutes. For each comparison, we ran the algorithms 1000 times, which is a suitable number of data points.
Comparison of Lemke-Howson and Multilinear Minimax Relaxation
First, we compared the speed of both algorithmsm, with the number of actions for games ranging up to 2000, and time ranging up to 30 minutes (1800 seconds). For games with number of actions around 150 and more, sometimes Lemke-Howson terminated early. In about 35.8% of the games with 150 actions, Lemke-Howson terminated early and did not give a Nash equilbrium. That percentage increased as the number of actions increases. In fact, for games with number of actions greater than or equal to 500, Lemke-Howson never terminated with a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, MMR still gave a solution even for actions up to 2000. For number of actions around 150 and greater, MMR outperformed Lemke-Howson. In summary, this makes MMR a tractable algorithm for computing relaxations of Nash equilibria for games with large number of actions. Figure 1 captures only In the remaining cases, that means one of the players had a worse MMR payoff than the Nash equilibrium payoff. Figure 3 shows the relative error between the payoff of the worse-off player's solution of MMR algorithm to its corresponding Nash equilibrium payoff found by Lemke-Howson algorithm. Suppose the MMR solution was p * = (x * , y * ) and the Nash equilibrium was p * = (x * , y * ). If Row had a worse MMR payoff, the relative error would be: 
Convex Scaling of Payoff Matrices
There is additional gain in computing the MMR solution. In the bimatrix case, let d = (d 1 , d 2 ) ∈ S 2 be the convex scaling for matrices R = (R ij ) and C = (C ij ), where S 2 = {u ∈ R 2 : u 1 + u 2 = 1, u 1 , u 2 ≥ 0}, i.e. replace R by d 1 R and C by d 2 C. The corresponding Nash Equilibrium for the scaled matrices will remain unchanged. However, the corresponding optimal multilinear minimax solution, denoted by (α * (d), p * (d)), may change, giving a new inequality from Theorem 2:
One may ask: Is there a d for which the Nash equilbrium p * = p * (d), and if so, is there an algorithm to compute the minimax approximation to obtain p * for the bimatrix case? Of course, such an algorithm stemming from PPAD-complete results may not be tractable. This If d ∈ S • 2 , the interior of S 2 , then
, gives a new point in S • 2 , giving rise to a new scaling. Convex scaling for the multilinear matrix was considered in [10] . In this paper, we take another route, and ask the question: Is there is a convex scaling for which the corresponding payoffs are equal? An advantage to such a scaling is that it's a satisfactory compromise to both players since, aside from equality of payoffs, MMR guarantees one player's payoff is always as good as any Nash equilibrium payoff. Note that the LP formulation of the convex scaling pair of matrices is the following:
Existence of a Convex Scaling Pair with Balanced MMR Payoffs
Here, we show that there will always exist a convex scaling pair d = (d 1 , d 2 ) ∈ S 2 so that the MMR payoffs for Row player and Column player will be equal. First, we give a definition.
Definition 1.
A profile is called 1-player-optimal if at least one player's payoff is greater than the payoffs in any Nash equilibria. A profile is called balanced if both payoffs are equal.
According to this definition, we know that the MMR solution is 1-player-optimal. In addition, we show that there is a convex scaling so that the corresponding MMR solution is also balanced. In fact, as our experimental results show, there are many such MMR solutions that are balanced. Theorem 3. Let R, C ∈ [0, 1] n×n be the payoff matrices for Row player and Column player, respectively. Assume R and C are not both identically zero. For each t ∈ [0, 1] let p * (t) = (p 1 * (t), p 2 * (t)) be the MMR solution corresponding to the case when R is replaced by tR and C by (1 − t)C. Then there exists t * ∈ [0, 1] such that,
hence, a balanced scaling.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing two results:
(1) If in a linear programming the constraint coefficient for one variable is changed continuously as a function of a single variable, the optimal objective value changes continuously.
(2) A continuous function from [0, 1] into itself has a fixed point. The proof of (2) is well known. Now scaling R by tR, t ∈ (0, 1), changes the corresponding LP (see SLP and SDLP), replacing δ in the constraint matrix by δ/t. By converting the LP into one in the standard form it is not difficult to prove that the optimal objective value changes continuously for t in this range. More specifically, consider continuously changing the coefficient of one of the variables, say x r , as a function of t in the standard LP min{c T x : Ax = b, x ≥ 0} where A is an m × n matrix of rank m. Using the standard LP notation, suppose B is an optimal m × m basis matrix. Then decomposing A and c in the standard LP fashion and denoting the j-th column of A by a j , the optimal objective value is c B B −1 b. Now if the variable x r is in the basis, and if a r changes continuously as a function of t, then by Cramer's rule, B −1 changes continuously, and since z j = c B B −1 a j changes continuously, so does the objective value. If x r is not in the basis, z r = c B B −1 a r changes continuously as a function of t. In particular, if z r − c r < 0, it remains less than zero for small changes in t. If z r − c r = 0 then there is alternate optimal solution so that we can bring z r into the basis and argue as in the previous case. Thus we have proved (1) . On the other hand, since R and C were assumed not to be identically 0, for t = 0 or t = 1, the corresponding optimal values are positive for one player and zero for the other player at each endpoint of the interval. Now consider the function f (t) = tR[P * (t)] − (1 − t)C[p * (t)]. By (1) it is a continuous function of t. On the other hand f (0) < 0 while f (1) > 0. Thus there exists t * where f (t * ) = 0, (by the standard proof of (2)).
Computations of Convex Scaling for Balanced MMR Payoffs
To compute a convex scaling such that the corresponding strategies gives balanced MMR payoffs, we consider the following method: let α 0 = 0, where the payoff for Row is less than the payoff for Column and let α 1 = 1, where the payoff for Row is greater than the payoff for Column. By continuity, there must exist an α 2 so that α 0 < α 2 < α 1 and the payoff for Row is equal to the payoff for Column. This α 2 can be searched using the Bisection Method, where for each iteration, set α 2 = (α 0 + α 1 )/2, and if the payoff for Row is less than the payoff for Column at α 2 , then set α 0 = α 2 . Otherwise, set α 1 = α 2 and continue. In fact, there is usually more than one such balanced convex scaling. In Figure 4 , we provide different graphs showing MMR payoffs for Row and Column players when using different scalings in [0, 1], illustrating this point, along with a vertical line at d 1 = .5 to show the comparison of unscaled expected payoffs between Row and Column. Choosing the best possible balanced convex scaling is, ideally, the most preferable scaling. 
Concluding Remarks and Future Work
In this paper, we considered the bimatrix case of multilinear minimax relaxation (MMR), decribed in [10] , which is a generalization of von Neumann's Minimax, and showed it gave better strategy profiles than the Nash equilibrium most of the time. We have computationally solved the corresponding primal-dual problems for square matrices with values between 0 and 1 with actions up to 2000, along with computations of the actual Nash equilibria via Lemke-Howson, whenever it terminated and gave a solution. In 80% of the games ran, MMR outperformed Lemke-Howson for the payoffs of both players. We conclude that based on these computations, MMR is a worthy algorithm for bimatrix games, and in these cases, ε-approximation is not sufficiently relevant. Because we used existing software to solve the LP's for MMR, a question arises: Can we find more efficient and specially-designed algorithms for LP's with games with a large number of actions? The multilinear minimax relaxation for more than two players is a future prospect that should be investigated. There are also state-of-the-art algorithms for computing Nash equilibria for n-player games, like the Govindan-Wilson algorithm [9] . Comparing the multilinear minimax relaxation with this such algorithms is also a subject for further study.
